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The second creation story in the Hebrew-Christian Bible, I expect, is 
familiar to us all. Adam and Eve disobey God and eat of the fruit of the 
tree of knowledge. Eating the fruit gives them knowledge of good and 
evil, as evidenced by their wanting not to be seen naked, and it is only 
then that sex enters human life. 
Nineteenth century geologists in Britain started out convinced that 
everything in the Christian Bible was literal truth, truth of the kind that 
science pursues. They found, though, that they couldn't reconcile the rock 
layers and fossils they studied with such a view. Darwin subsequently 
devised a naturalistic framework for explaining the changes in species that 
the rock layers had revealed and the features of plants and animals that look 
intricately designed. The upshot of these familiar developments, though, 
has been a puzzle. We do seem to know good from evil-not always but 
often. Still, the hard scientific work of many investigators tells us that 
our genetic makeup is a product of natural selection, and an organism's 
genes act, as it were, as a recipe for making an organism. An organism, 
in consequence of all this, looks amazingly as if it were designed. Eyes, 
for instance, seem amazingly as if they had been designed for seeing. We 
are not, in any literal sense, designed and manufactured, but it is much as 
if we had been. And what are we, as it were, designed to do? Ultimately, 
to proliferate our genes in later generations, under the conditions of our 
ancestors. That is the answer that evolutionary theory gives. This answer, 
though, is hard to reconcile with any ordinary view of ourselves. Why, 
among other things, would such a design build in us a capacity to know 
good and evil? 
I must hasten to add that a story of our knowledge will need to include 
social history. Darwinian selection of genes did shape the propensities a 
human baby starts out with, the baby's genetic recipes and the designs 
these are recipes for. With the child and the adult, however, genetic selec-
tion is only part of the story. The child and the adult are the ways they are 
not only because of their genetic design, but because of all sorts of social 
interactions as the person develops through childhood and adulthood to 
the end of life. Norwegians speak Norwegian of various kinds, and Greeks 
speak Greek, but not because their genes differ. We learn and pick up 
aspects of our culture, such as language, from those around us. Likewise 
with morals: headhunters have moral views that are vastly different from 
those of anyone in this room. (Or perhaps we shouldn't call these views 
precisely moral, but they do seem to think it all right, and indeed glorious, 
to kill people to garner their heads.) 
We can't, though, think of our minds and conduct as having genetic 
aspects and social aspects. Many significant aspects of us are due to both 
in interaction. We learn throughout life, and that's because our genes 
designed us, as it were, for learning of various kinds. Take language as 
a prime example: As our ancestors over the generations did more and 
more of the things that are now involved in speaking and understanding 
a language, selection pressures favored various proto-linguistic compe-
tences. Proto-language changed over the generations hand in hand with 
proto-linguistic competence. An ancestor of 4000 generations ago, say, 
wasn't equipped, genetically, to speak all of the proto-language of ances-
tors 1000 generations later. Evolutionists talk of "co-evolution" of such 
things as proto-language and genetic proclivities for proto-language. The 
upshot, highly abbreviated, is this: we are genetically designed to respond 
in systematic ways to social cues, in such realms as language and ethos. 
These responses are what we call learning and acculturation, along with 
invention, wit, creativity, and the like. History and culture we can see as 
aspects of human ecology, patterns of interactions of organisms whose 
initial proclivities are designed, as it were, into the genes. 
Back, then, to how our ethical natures fit into such a picture. Can we 
accept a scientific account of our nature along such lines and still regard 
ourselves as capable of moral thinking and moral knowledge? I'll be argu-
ing that perhaps we can, and arguing for a particular way of trying to fit 
our view of ourselves as moral beings into an evolutionary and ecological 
view of ourselves. I won't be saying much about how evolutionary theory 
might help explain our proclivities to moral judgment, although that is a 
fascinating and important question and there is a great deal of work on 
it that well deserves discussion. Today, though, I'll just suppose that it 
can, and ask the philosophical question of whether the states that figure 
in such an explanation might qualify as knowledge. 
Expressivism and Non-naturalism 
Philosophers from Socrates on have disputed what we mean when 
we make ethical statements. In this lecture, I'll of course have to skip 
over most of the issues that come up in these debates, but I'll take up 
two kinds of positions. My own is called "expressivistic", and the other 
is sometimes called "non-naturalistic". Expressivists and non-naturalists 
alike reject another kind of position called "analytical naturalism", which 
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holds that ethical claims can be put in tenns fit to incorporate into empirical 
sciences like psychology. The claim "I must go." for instance, doesn't 
mean that I plan to go, since you could agree that I plan to go but reject 
my protestation that I must go. 
Let's begin with some tenninological housekeeping. Ethical claims 
are part of a larger category of claims that are called normative. These 
include, for example, the claims of nonnative epistemology, which asks 
what beliefs are warranted. The realm of the normative, we can say, is the 
"oughty", or as Wilfrid Sellars put it, whatever is "fraught with ought". 
Many questions about morality really pertain to the normative realm in 
general. I favor a proposal of A.C. Ewing many decades ago: in effect, 
that we can analyze this range of claims as containing a special, primitive 
concept of ought.1 This concept comes both in permissive and mandatory 
versions, and I'll use the term 'warranted' for the permissive one, and for 
the mandatory one, 'ought' or 'must'. Alternatively, we could say that the 
basic concept involved is that of a reason, in the sense of a reason to do 
such-and-such or to believe such-and-such.2 Then we can talk of having 
sufficient reason or conclusive reason, with the first permissive and the 
second mandatory. These tenns are, I think. all interdefinable, and it won't 
matter which we take as basic. Using the concept of warrant, we can say 
things like this: An act is morally wrong if a person who contemplates 
doing it ought to feel a moral aversion to it. Here by a moral aversion, I 
mean a certain familiar guilt-tinged feeling toward doing it. (I owe this 
proposal to Howard Nye.) 
Begin with non-naturalism, then. Non-naturalists say that warrant 
is a non-natural property. Nothing further can be said; the property is 
simple in the sense of having no components. An alternative version 
would distinguish properties and concepts of properties, and say that the 
concept WARRANT is simple and non-naturalistic.3 I prefer this version, but 
I won't argue the case here. T. M. Scanlon takes what I am calling a non-
naturalistic view, but with the concept REASON TO as basic. A reason to do 
something, he tells us, is a consideration that counts in favor of doing it, 
and nothing further can be said to define the notion. • 
Many of us find non-naturalism baffling. I do take myself to under-
stand talk of reasons to do a thing, or of acts or beliefs as warranted. I am 
puzzled, though, why I should think that the universe contains properties 
that are non-natural, or why non-naturalistic concepts would be legitimate 
parts of our thinking. I don't want to give up normative concepts, but I 
do have a right to be puzzled. How could I have gained knowledge of a 
non-naturalistic subject matter? 
Non-naturalists have long responded that mathematics raises the same 
questions. We think mathematically, although mathematics is a matter of 
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necessary truths and not an empirical part of the natural world. Still, the 
more elementary parts of mathematics, like arithmetic and geometry, are 
closely involved with empirical knowledge. When we collect and count 
pebbles, we depend on the deliverances of arithmetic. Mathematical 
Platonists claim that in mathematics, we apply a kind of insight that is of 
much the same kind as some ethical non-naturalists claim, and thereby 
learn about, among other things, properties of infinite sets that are far re-
moved from any applications to the familiar world. These claims, though, 
I think, need scrutiny. The clearly legitimate parts of mathematics raise 
no great puzzle for the abilities of evolved organisms to grasp them. 
I'll now sketch my own, expressivistic answer, which in a nutshell 
goes like this: Pretty much everything non-naturalists say in elucidating 
their position is right, properly understood. Still, there's more to be had 
by way of explanation than they give. The key to our ability to wield non-
naturalistic concepts is that these concepts are directive. Their role is to 
figure in action and the like. Since we evolved to act and to be intelligent 
about it, we evolved to have directive concepts. The prime biological 
function of these concepts is to figure in thinking what to do. 
I'll sketch this approach only quickly, with the aim, eventually, of 
getting back to moral knowledge. In my 2003 book Thinking How to 
Live, I began with the slogan that oughts or musts are plans. Believing 1 
must leave at noon amounts to planning to leave at noon. This can at best 
be rough, however. Aren't beliefs, after all, quite different from plans? 
Also, not all normative beliefs are as straightforwardly tied to plans as is 
the belief that I must leave at noon. Take for instance, the claim, .. Either 
it's not yet noon or I must leave now". To believe this isn't yet to plan 
whether to leave now. My slogan that musts are plans at the very least 
needs refinement. 
Here is a second and much better approximation: Normative beliefs 
are restrictions. Take again the claim that either it's not yet noon or I must 
leave now. To believe this is to rule out a combination of states of mind: I 
rule out the combination, disbelieving that it's not yet noon and rejecting 
planning to leave now. More generally, a normative belief restricts one 
to certain combinations of naturalistic belief and plan. This second ap-
proximation is what I'll be discussing-though I'll introduce some further 
refinements in the course of my discussion. 
Earmarks of the Cognitive 
T. M. Scanlon is a non-naturalist, in the terminology I am using, and 
he has criticized the expressivistic theory of normative judgments 1 am 
sketching. When you and I disagree on some normative issue, Scanlon 
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says, the issue between us is at base this: "whether a certain consideration 
is or is not a reason for some attitude." He continues, 
The answer to this question is, I am drawn toward 
saying, something that is properly expressed in the 
assertoric mode, is capable of being true, and can be 
the object ofbelief.s 
These, he says, are earmarks of the cognitive. Now this is quite right for 
the bald slogan that musts are plans. How does it apply, though, to the 
claim that normative beliefs are restrictions of the kind I am proposing? 
Such restrictions have the earmarks of the "cognitive" that Scanlon cites 
and more. We can start out as expressivists and interpret, explain, and 
indeed accept many of the things that a "normative realist" like Scanlon 
claims. The view that we can do this is known as "quasi-realism", a term 
coined by Simon Blackburn.6 
If normative beliefs are restrictions of the kind I am proposing, I 
claim, they will have the marks of the cognitive that Scanlon lists. Can they 
be expressed in the assertoric mode? I just explained how we can voice 
one such restriction with the declarative sentence, "It's not yet noon or I 
must leave." What licenses me to do such a thing is the way restrictions 
or rulings-out combine freely into negations, disjunctions and the like. 
Declarative syntax allows just this. To accept a negation, for instance, is 
to rule out accepting what's negated. What, then, of truth? So long as we 
can agree or disagree with such states, anyone who plans can properly 
regard them as true or false. To think such a state true is to agree with it, 
and to think it false is to disagree. And if we neither agree nor disagree? 
Then our state is one of uncertainty; we haven't made up our minds 
about the components. Still, we'll think the state to be true or false in this 
sense: if we made up our minds on the components, we'd either agree or 
disagree. Our attitude toward the state thus acts like ordinary uncertainty 
as to whether a naturalistic claim is true or false. 
Are restrictions like these beliefs? Scanlon worries that my account 
might not allow that they are. On this question, much will depend on 
what we mean by beliefs. In my 1990 book Wise Choices, I insisted that 
normative judgments are not beliefs, but by 2003 with my book Thinking 
How to Live, I realized that I wasn't clear what this denial amounted to. 7 
The restrictions I was talking about-restrictions on combinations of plans 
and naturalistic beliefs-have various earmarks of belief. One can agree 
or disagree with them, and voice their content in declarative sentences. 
They do, to be sure, have a special feature: they can be explained in the 
way I have been doing. Why, though, must that disqualify them as beliefs? 
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Often people distinguish beliefs from plans, intentions, desires, and 
the like by what's called "direction of fit". Beliefs have a "mind to world" 
direction of fit, in that the mind is to have the belief that fits how the world 
is. Plans have a "world to mind" direction of fit, in that the world is to be 
made to fit the plan one has in mind. Consider, though, the belief that I 
must go now. This has a direction of fit that is world to mind. The world 
is to be made to fit the belief, by my going. True, we can also say that it 
has the other direction of fit: my mind is to have the belief that I must go 
now just in case I must go now. What in the world this state of affairs is, 
though, is puzzling, this state of affairs that I must go now. Theorists are 
driven to saying mysteriously that it is a "non-natural" state of affairs. My 
account doesn't need such mysteries, and the other state of affairs-my 
going now-is straightforward. If, then, the restrictions I'm talking about 
don't quality as beliefs because they have the wrong direction of fit, then 
my belief that I must go now fails to quality on the same grounds. Or 
more precisely, it qualifies only at the cost of admitting non-natural states 
of affairs. We don't need to believe in such states of affairs, or if we do, 
it will simply be as what we are committed to by the kinds of restrictions 
I am describing. 
My objection to non-naturalism, I should stress, is not to anything that 
all non-natumlists say. It is to leaving too much unexplained, or introduc-
ing explanations that are needlessly suspect. I agree with non-naturalists 
that we can't give a straight definition of' must' or other nonnative tenns. 
I offer, though, an oblique explanation, an explanation of what having 
nonnative beliefs consist in. The building blocks of my account are 
"planning" and restrictions on states of mind like planning. These, I say, 
are intelligible right off the bat in a way that musts and reasons are not. 
Until they are explained, musts are theoretical danglers in my systematic 
picture of the world. Having a plan is not a dangler, and restrictions on 
states of mind are not. 
"Plans" and What Expressivism Gains 
Am I offering a real explanation? What can I say to explain having 
a plan in my sense? I must confess at the outset that I'm using the tenn 
'plan' differently from the way we ordinarily do. In the ordinary sense, 
I'm not planning something unless I believe that, when the time comes, 
I'll do it. Consider a stock example of mine, the binge alcoholic who gets 
disastrously drunk every Saturday night and spends the rest of the week 
regretting it. He knows, alas, that come Saturday night, he will take a first 
drink and then another and then many more. In my sense, though, his plan 
for Saturday night is to keep strictly away from liquor. In the ordinary 
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sense, in contrast, this doesn't seriously qualify as a plan of his, because 
he believes he won't carry it out. His belief that he must shun the bottle, 
I can try saying, is what's left in planning apart from the belief that one 
will stick with one's plan and carry it out. 
What, though, has been accomplished? Having a plan, the non-
naturalist can now say, itself involves having a belief as to what one must 
do in the contingency planned for. Plans, then, can only be explained in 
tenns of musts, and not the other way around. How can plans, in my sense, 
be explained without invoking musts? 
One thing I have said about this may be indefensible. The proof of 
the plan is in the execution, l have thought. Suppose l restrict my plans 
to ones that include leaving for home at noon tomorrow. Then unless I 
don't stick to this restriction, at noon tomorrow l'llleave. But this leads 
to an objection. I might genuinely think at noon that I must leave right 
then, and fail to leave. That's what we call akrasia, or weakness of will. 
Scanlon pictures a case where I need to call my doctor to learn the re-
sults of a biopsy, which I dread.8 I can finnly believe that I must call this 
instant, he says, and still not call. Now it seems to me that ordinarily in 
such a situation, as the moment to call arrives, I change my mind a little. 
I believe that I must call, but out of dread, I come to think "but not quite 
yet." Still, couldn't I believe finnly, "I must call this instant or it will be 
too late," and still not bring myself to call? I'd better accommodate this 
possibility-and once I do, do I have an explanation of the states of mind 
involved that isn't the non-naturalist's? 
In Wise Choices in 1990, I speculated that we have a "nonnative 
control system" as part of our psychic makeup, but that it can be over-
whelmed by appetite, embarrassment, dread, and the like. This fits more 
recent work in empirical psychology that supports what's called "dual 
process theory".9 Without technical jargon, we can say this: Planning 
works in a characteristic way. We contemplate a situation we aren't in but 
might be in, think what to do in it, and then when the time comes, often 
do just that. Plans, we can say, are deliverances of this apparatus. Another 
feature of our psychic makeup is reasoning, and we can regiment what's 
involved as restricting our plans and naturalistic beliefs in certain ways. 
The restrictions I'm talking about are deliverances ofthese systems, which 
we characterize by their typical functioning. This account will allow that 
I can act in violation of a restriction that I accept. That just means that 
more than one control system bears on what I do-just as psychologists' 
dual process theory suggests. 
Has all this explained anything, though, in a way that the non-naturalist 
can't match? Philosophers of mind call what I have given a "functional" 
account of beliefs about musts, an account which identifies these states 
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of mind by their role in a mental economy. The non-naturalist can equally 
well offer such a functional account of these beliefs as states of mind that 
we can identify by their functional role. Indeed if the account I have given 
is right, then this non-naturalist project has got to work too. I, after all, 
explain these beliefs as states of mind having a certain functional role, 
and if my explanation is right, the non-naturalist could just copy it for 
the states of mind he calls beliefs in independent reasons. Perhaps our 
explanations are just two ways of saying the same thing. 
This functionalist non-naturalism, though, faces a worry that expres-
sivism doesn't. The idea of functionalism for beliefs is that a state of 
belief is characterized by its place in a network of usual causes. Consider, 
though. J. L. Mackie when he propounded his error theory for morality. He 
wasn't doubting that moral beliefs have such functional roles. What, after 
all, was his objection to moral beliefs? He compared belief in morality to 
belief in witchcraft, but that doesn't seem to capture the proper worry. It's 
clear enough what it would be for there to be witches, even though there 
aren't any. Moral beliefs, though, he characterized as beliefs in properties 
with a built-in to-be-doneness, properties that we can detect. His telling 
objection must be that we lack all conception of what it would be for a 
property to have this built-in to-be-doneness. The whole idea is unintel-
ligible. Now if the worry is that warrant and the like are unintelligible 
notions, it won't help to tell us that beliefs in warrant have a certain place 
in a mental network of causes. States of seeming belief can have such 
causal properties and still be unintelligible. What, then, would make a 
belief in warrant genuine and intelligible? Perhaps the non-naturalist can 
say, but we do need an answer to this. With plans and restrictions on plans, 
this problem loses its bite. Could I seriously worry that a plan to leave 
at noon is unintelligible? Could I seriously question the intelligibility of 
restrictions on my plans, such as my rejecting leaving after noon? 
I don't mean that there's no downside to all this, but I'll have to be 
choosy about which problems I explore. In the rest of this lecture, I'll re-
turn to moral knowledge. I'll ask about some puzzles that claims to moral 
knowledge can raise. In particular, I'll ask whether we are forced to think 
that warrant and reasons to do things are all somehow mind-dependent, 
resting either on the responses of the beholder, or on the motives of the 
person who acts. 
Cultural Differences and Mind-Independence 
My teacher Richard Brandt, in the late 1940's, spent a year studying the 
ethical thinking of some Hopi Indians. A central question he investigated 
was whether any ethical differences between Hopi and Euro-American 
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thinking were fundamental, rather than being grounded in differences on 
matters of non-ethical fact. He found almost none, but he did find one 
candidate he couldn't eliminate. Young Hopi men had played a game we 
might call chicken pull. It involved burying a chicken up to its neck in 
the ground, and then riding by on their horses and seeing who could pull 
the chicken out of the ground by its neck. The Hopi saw nothing wrong 
with this game. Brandt asked them whether the chicken felt pain, and they 
answered that it did, that a chicken feels pain in the same way we do. So 
the Hopi believed the non-normative things that Brandt's own community 
was convinced make such games morally wrong. But they didn't think 
the game in any way wrong.10 
The facts that Brandt reports are more complex than my summary. 
I'll speak, though, of .. Brandt's Hopi", and just stipulate that whatever 
the actual facts, these are hypothetical people who fit the picture I just 
sketched. We can take it, then, that if you or I had been brought up like 
Brandt's Hopi, we too would have seen nothing wrong with a game that 
hurts a chicken. 
I myself am convinced that the fact that the game causes the chicken 
to experience severe pain is weighty reason not to play it, fun though the 
game must be. It is reason not to play it not only for people in my own 
community, but for Brandt's Hopi who see nothing wrong with the game 
and live in a community that sees nothing wrong with it. Here I'm talking 
about reasons in the normative sense, considerations that count in favor 
or against. This conviction of mine, I say, amounts to a plan for how to 
weigh considerations for the case of being one of Brandt's Hopi. 
Is my conviction a case of knowledge? It's controversial among 
philosophers how to explain the concept ofknowledge. One way, though, 
may be to try saying that knowledge is reliable belief. We can understand 
reliability as a normative notion: reliable belief is beliefto rely on. We'll 
doubtless rely on our own judgments on matters like causing pain to ani-
mals, and I take it that we ought to rely on them. If I'm right about this, 
then our judgments may indeed qualify as knowledge. 
Still, what are we to make ofBrandt's Hopi? It's hard to see why they 
should be worse judges of the matter than we are, except in a question-
begging way. Can we claim moral knowledge when their disbelief seems 
as well grounded as our belief? 
Considerations like these convince some philosophers that all reasons 
must somehow be mind-dependent. Mind-dependence views can come in 
two broad versions. One holds that reasons to do things must depend on the 
motives of the person doing it. Reasons to spare a chicken suffering, in the 
case of Brandt's Hopi, must depend on their own sensibilities, their mo-
tives, feelings, and judgments. We can call this the agent mind-dependence 
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are justified in light of their sense of plausibility, as when they are confused 
and incoherent in their reasoning, but what's justified by way of beliefs 
will depend in part on what they find plausible. 
The same goes formatters of natural fact. Take, for instance, whether 
life results from natural selection and is billions of years old. Our evidence 
is consistent with a hypothesis that I find bizarrely implausible: that a 
deceiving spirit, six thousand years ago, made the world with rock layers 
and fossils, junk DNA and various degrees of genetic similarity among 
species, and other such features, with the aim of producing a world that 
has all the apparent traces of a history billions of years old. Now it's a 
fact, I take it, that that's not how the history of our Earth went. This fact 
is not merely with respect to me and others who share some trust in most 
of standard scientific method. Things just didn't happen that way. Still, 
it's at least conceivable that someone who understood the evidence and 
arguments would find the deceiver/creator hypothesis more plausible than 
scientists' consensus on the matter. The two hypotheses, after all, equally 
well fit the evidence. So, indeed, does the puzzler we ran into in intro-
ductory philosophy, the hypothesis that everything came into being five 
minutes ago, after I started this lecture, with everything in place, including 
me with my seeming memories. I'll call my hypothetical character, the 
knowledgeable, coherent evolution denier, "Wilberforce". I don't know 
if any actual evolution deniers fit my stipulation of Wilberforce, but it's 
at least conceivable that one might. All this wouldn't, though, render 
standard scientific views true with respect to some people and not others. 
I maintain also that the evidence available to scientists supports an 
earth billions of years old, and species formed by natural selection. It isn't 
evidence for these conclusions just with respect to some people but not 
with respect to Wilberforce. Still, it is indeed the case that by Wilberforce's 
lights, as I have stipulated him, this very totality of evidence supports the 
deceiver hypothesis. 
We need to distinguish, then, what makes something wrong and-what 
makes something a reason-from what justifies our thinking the things 
we do on these questions. We must distinguish the basis of something's 
being wrong from the justification of a view that it's wrong. Justification 
can only be mind-dependent in some way, whereas bases for being wrong 
needn't hinge ultimately on human minds. 
Darwinian Challenges 
Despite what I have been saying, Brandt's Hopi still raise a puzzle for 
moral realists. Suppose we are investigating a matter of ordinary natural 
fact, such as the frequency of disease in a population. If our method of 
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investigation isn't one that will somehow "track" the facts of the matter, 
it isn't to be relied on. A rumor that we expect would arise whether or 
not it was true, for instance, is no indication of truth. Also, ifl know that 
another method ofinquiry, equally reliable, would yield a different result, 
I shouldn't rely on the method of inquiry I happened to use. Suppose two 
well credentialed doctors regard each other as fools, and each, I know, 
would tell me something different. I then have no reason to believe the 
one I happen to consult, as opposed to the other. If there's a fact as to 
whether animal pain is worth avoiding, and if we and Brandt's Hopi are 
equally reliable indicators of that fact, there may be no more reason for 
me to rely on my own judgment than to rely on the judgment of one of 
them. 
One version of such worries is argued by Sharon Street. Our proclivi-
ties to moral judgment were shaped by natural selection. But if moral facts 
are mind-independent, she argues, then there's no reason to think we would 
have been selected to get them right as such. Of course we, convinced 
as we are that pain is bad and loyalty good, will congratulate ourselves 
on being selected to think so. But no matter what the moral facts were, 
we would end up similarly congratulating ourselves on the discernment 
natural selection equipped us with. 11 
Brandt's Hopi disagree with me, and as I say, nothing non-question-
begging disqualifies them as moral judges. Still, I can respond, in the end, 
I can only judge by my own lights. I do often trust the judgment of others, 
but ultimately it has to be by my own lights that I judge them trustworthy. 
Even so, however, I have to worry, Brandt's Hopi too must judge ultimately 
by their own lights. And we can't both be right. Aren't we again forced 
to conclude that all reasons to act are ultimately grounded in something 
about someone 's mind-the person who does it or the person who judges? 
According to my own theory of normative concepts, normative judg-
ments are restrictions on plans and on combinations of plans and beliefs. 
Surely when I plan what to do, I have to go by my own lights. So when I 
judge questions of reasons or warrant, it has to be by my own lights. This 
goes for reasons to do things not only in my own case, but in the case 
of being one of Brandt's Hopi. I still must plan by my own lights, and 
so judge the warrant of their acts and responses by my own lights. I am 
judging irresponsibly, to be sure, if I don't learn what things are like for 
them and how the things they could do figure in their own lives and the 
sense of significance with which they live. These matters require great 
perspica-city, and I should be very cautious in judging what others ought 
to do, to believe, or to feel. These precautions, though, needn't preclude 
me from thinking Brandt's Hopi wrong to play the game they play. 
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What am I to say to Brandt's Hopi, though, once I'm convinced that 
there could be no way of reasoning them out of their indifference to hurting 
a chicken? I may try to work a transfonnation in their views by impas-
sioned preaching and the like-and of course they can try the same sorts 
of things with me. What I can't do any longer, though, is to treat them as 
fellow inquirers into whether animal pain matters for what to do. I need to 
put my head together with others to think problems like this through, and 
I'd gladly put my head together with Brandt's Hopi to think through vari-
ous other questions that perturb me. Perhaps, for instance, we can discuss, 
in such a spirit, the phenomena of different basic judgments in different 
cultures. With the moral significance of hurting animals, however, I may 
have to take a stance that, in my 1990 book WISe Choices, Apt Feelings, 
I labeled "parochial".12 
Why, though, can't the nonnative realist now say exactly the same 
things? One can only rely, in the end, on one's own lights, and join in with 
people who one hopes can share one's inquiries. Other people, likewise 
going ultimately by their own lights, may come to different conclusions, 
and if they are set in their ways and coherent, one may have to take a 
stance toward them that is parochial. Still, by our own lights, there are 
reasons to do things that depend neither on the mind of the agent nor on the 
mind of the beholder. Being a reason is a relation between a consideration 
and thing a person might do, and this relation, the moral realist can say, 
is a matter of objective fact, sometimes independent of both agent and 
beholder. 
Street's Darwinian dilemma, though, still besets this kind of moral 
realism. Ultimately I have to go by my own lights, true enough, but by my 
own lights, when I think about it, natural selection wouldn't make me an 
indicator of nonnative truth. Truth would have nothing systematic to do 
with what I judged to be true. All this looks like good news for opponents 
of nonnative realism. 
Street poses a dilemma, though, not only for full-fledged nonnative 
realists, but for quasi-realists like me-this in an as yet unpublished 
paperY We quasi-realists don't start out talking about properties and 
relations that are nonnative aspects of the world. We start with such things 
as plans and restrictions. The upshot, though, we claim, exactly mimics 
a nonnative realism. (When I talk about "nonnative realism" here, I'll 
always mean of the non-naturalistic kind.) That, however, raises a new 
dilemma. On the one horn, we might succeed in mimicking nonnative 
realism exactly. In that case, though, we must be susceptible to the 
Darwinian dilemma just as much as full-fledged nonnative realists are. 
On the other hom, we might avoid building the features into our view 
that render nonnative realism susceptible to the Darwinian dilemma. In 
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that case, we have failed in our aim of saving the features of normative 
realism that characterize ordinary normative thought. 
Vast and Tempered Normative Realism 
We need, I think, to distinguish two kinds of non-naturalistic views 
whose proponents call themselves "moral realists". First, there's the view 
that moral truths and other normative truths are facts like any other, except 
that they aren't empirical, naturalistic truths. They differ from scientific 
truths in their subject matter, but not in the features that make scientific 
facts genuine facts. I'll call this vast normative realism. Such a view, 
though, won't stand up to scrutiny, I agree, for the kinds of reasons I have 
rehearsed. If moral facts are facts like any other, we have to explain how 
we are capable of knowing them, and how, if others disagree, they come 
to be less capable of knowing them. True, we can only go by our own 
lights. But with ordinary properties like the shapes of everyday objects, 
we arrive, by our own lights, at a story of how, though the evolution of 
our species design, we came to be capable of getting such things right. As 
for a modem science, it is an extension of common sense, but a culturally 
peculiar one stemming from Europe in the modem age and now spread 
throughout the world. (I recognize, of course, that it got its start with 
important influences from China, India, the Muslim world, and elsewhere, 
but still, as we know it, science is a culturally special development.) We 
can trust parts of science, by our lights, only if there's an account to be had 
of why the social processes that produce the findings would be reliable. 
Where there isn't, we ought to be skeptical, and ifthere never is, we are 
left with the paradoxes of extreme science studies skepticism. By these 
standards, our problem is, a realist who insists that normative facts are 
facts like any other dooms us to normative skepticism. 
Normative realism usually, though, takes a more tempered form than 
I am describing. Whereas vast normative realism treats our judgments 
as indicators of facts separate from us, laying us open to the question 
of whether our judgments are truly indications at all of normative facts 
independent of us, any more than exotic judgments are, this tempered 
normative realism does no such thing. It cultivates standards for when 
normative judgments are to be trusted, but doesn't follow through on 
treating our judgments fully as indicators of independent facts. It rejects 
a perceptual model for how we get moral knowledge. 14 It denies that there 
could be basic normative facts radically beyond our power to know them. 15 
As Ronald Dworkin, a tempered moral realist, says, "If you can't help 
believing something, steadily and wholeheartedly, you'd better believe 
it."16 This isn't good advice to a detective investigating the fact of who 
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did a murder, absent an independently verifiable track record of correct 
crime-solving hunches. It may, though, be good advice to someone asking 
what's worth pursuing in life. 
A vast normative realism holds normative facts up to the same 
epistemic standards as plain facts of our surroundings. Normative facts 
are bound to fail these tests. A half-way, tempered normative realism 
recognizes a gulf between these paradigm facts and normative facts. 
Normative facts, it holds, are independent of the beholder, and sometimes 
are independent of the aims and sensibilities of the people they apply to. 
Still, they needn't have all the epistemic credentials of paradigm facts. 
Now that I have contrasted a vast normative realism with a halfway, 
tempered normative realism, you could ask me which kind I think we 
quasi-realists can mimic. The answer should be clear enough. Once we 
convince ourselves that we are products of the evolution and ecology of 
our species with its special cultural histories, we can't take a vast nor-
mative realism seriously. The only credible candidate for emulation is a 
tempered normative realism. I can now try saying this: A vast normative 
realism falls to Darwinian dilemmas and questions of why to think we 
can discern the normative facts and others can't. A tempered normative 
realism isn't so defeated, and that's the kind of normative realism we aim 
to mimic. 
Quasi-Realism's Advantage 
Despite its cautious restraint, I don't think that this tempered realist 
position will quite hold up. Indeed if it did, we expressivists would face 
the challenge of why to be expressivists, in the normative realm, rather 
than straight normative realists of the tempered kind. Tempered normative 
realism, though, is unsatisfactory in itself. True enough, most of the views 
it takes can be interpreted as reasonable, via quasi-realism, but there is 
one aspect of it that can't be. Tempered realism still insists that normative 
facts are just as much facts as are the paradigms offacthood. They aren't in 
any way second rate as facts. If that's so, however, whence the tempering? 
The putative facts somehow don't entirely act like paradigm facts, but if 
their facthood is what's basic to them, why don't they? The wise realist 
will be a tempered one, I agree, but how shall we explain this need for 
tempering? The answer can't be that normative facts are simply facts like 
any other. 
The tempered realist is asking about something he starts out thinking 
to be a fact, that pain in animals matters in itself. Its being a candidate fact 
is supposed to figure centrally in explaining how to judge it. Like the vast 
realist, then, he still must face a question: Should the fact that Brandt's 
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Hopi don't apprehend this fact shake my faith that I myself do? It still 
seems that it should, unless it's plausible that I'm better placed than they 
to think about such things. 
What quasi-realism mimics is not tempered realism as a whole, but 
tempered realism in all but one aspect. Like the tempered realist, we 
quasi-realists can say that what makes the game of chicken-pull wrong is 
not our disapproval, and not some deep disquiet on the part of those who 
play it, but how it hurts the chicken. Like the tempered realist, we can say 
that we can only go by our own lights, even if by our own lights, we can't 
show ourselves better equipped for normative judgment than those with 
whom we disagree. We can't, though, mimic the claim that understanding 
normative properties and relations as objective matters offact is basic to 
explaining how judgments of wrongness work. That, as I have said, isn't 
a credible claim. 
Still, don't similar questions arise for plans? I plan to comment 
substantially on student papers when I could do something more fun and 
get away with cursory markings on the papers. This planning manifests 
my thinking it more important to fulfill my responsibilities and educate 
my students than to be having a good time. How do I know that it's more 
important? Thinking these things just consists, according to my account of 
normative claims, in planning to weigh some considerations more heavily 
than others in my decisions. But I think that a person could be mistaken 
in these weightings. I think Brandt's Hopi, for instance, were mistaken in 
giving no weight to the pain of chickens, even though they believed that 
the chicken's pain resembles our own. How do I know, then, that it isn't 
I myself who am mistaken? 
I'll hold my plans up to standards that mimic, in some ways, epistemic 
standards for judging matters of scientific fact. I won't, for instance, trust 
an ethical judgment ifl think that vivid and repeated contemplation of the 
non-ethical facts would lead me to change my mind. Such standards we 
might call a normative epistemology for moral and other normative judg-
ments.17 If this epistemology exactly emulates the realist's epistemology, 
I agree, it will be subject to the same refutations. But it doesn't exactly 
mimic a vast realist's epistemology. It does substantially mimic a halfway, 
tempered realism, but not the features that lead to the collapse of such 
a tempered realism. Rather, it mimics the features that bring tempered 
realism in line with common sense. 
As a quasi-realist, I start out thinking my question to be how to live. 
I settle, among other things, on weighing animal pain in my decisions. I 
settle on this even for the hypothetical case ofbeing one of Brandt's Hopi, 
who don't weigh animal pain into their choices. I may worry that I'd plan 
differently ifl were one of Brandt's Hopi. Still, what pain is like weighs 
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much more heavily in my planning than do such worries. It weighs, by my 
lights, against causing such pain. Now ethical thoughts, on such a view, 
become very much like factual thoughts in some ways. That's a principal 
thesis the quasi-realist strives to establish. But ethical thoughts are like 
factual thoughts only in those ways that follow from the possibility of 
disagreement and other such features that ethical and factual thoughts 
share. 
I conclude, then, that the tempered non-naturalistic realist runs into an 
anomaly that the quasi-realist doesn't. He starts out with ethical facts, and 
then has to worry why they aren't appropriately tested in all the ways that 
other facts can be. I say that the normative is fact-like in extensive ways, 
but its primary explanatory feature is that normative beliefs are restrictions 
on states of mind, on states of mind that combine naturalistic belief with 
plan. These needn't, though, have all the features of paradigm facts, even 
when they are true. They do tum out to have characteristic features that a 
tempered non-naturalistic realist accords them. Their being like paradigm 
facts, though, isn't what's doing the basic explaining. We quasi-realists 
have a different explanation of what the tempered non-natural realist 
claims. We mimic most of tempered realism, but on a different basis. 
Moral Knowledge 
I set out to talk about moral knowledge, our knowledge of good 
and evil, but I haven't said much explicit about knowledge. A belief is 
knowledge if, in light of its features, it is a belief to rely on, and I have 
been exploring worries about relying on one's judgment in normative 
matters. Beliefs about reliability, on the account I am giving, themselves 
amount to plans to rely on some kinds of beliefs and not on others. In 
asking what we know, if this is right, we are engaged in planning our 
reliance on beliefs formed in certain ways. These plans amount to belief 
in a normative epistemology. I have been exploring possible grounds for 
a blanket distrust of all our normative judgments, and arguing that we can 
coherently go ahead and judge by our own lights, so long as we do so with 
due care. If need be,l have argued, we can depend ultimately on our own 
lights, even when we disagree with others, and legitimately count what 
we end up with as knowledge. If I am right in what I have been saying, 
then some of this will be knowledge of good and evil. 
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Notes 
I. Ewing, "A Suggested Non-Naturalistic Definition of Good" (1939). 
2. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other ( 1998). 
3. By a convention adapted from Paul Horwich, I shall sometimes refer to 
concepts by using small caps. 
4. Scanlon, What We Owe(l998), p. 17. 
5. Scanlon, "Metaphysics and Morals" (2003), p. 17. 
6. Blackburn, Spreading the Word(l984), p. 171 and elsewhere. 
7. My Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990) and Thinking How to Live (2003). 
8. Scanlon, "Reasons and Decisions" (2006), p. 722. 
9. On dual process theory, see, for example, Kahneman, "Maps of Bounded 
Rationality", and Chaiken and Trope, D11al Process Theories (1999). 
10. Brandt, Hopi Ethics (1954), pp. 213-216. 
II. Street, "Darwinian Dilemma" (2006). 
12. Chaps. 12-13. 
13. Street, "Mind-Independence" (2009). 
14. Scanlon, "Metaphysics and Morals" (2003), p. 8; Dworkin, "Objectivity 
and Truth" (1996), pp. 104-105. 
15. Nagel, View from Nowhere (1986), p. 139. 
16. Dworkin, "Objectivity and Truth" ( 1996), p. 118. 
17. For an example of such standards, see Brandt on his "qualified attitude 
method", Ethical Theory ( 1959), pp. 244-252. 
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